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Abstract— Mobile medical apps are a growing mechanism 
for healthcare delivery through an increasingly complex 
network of information technology systems connecting 
patients, doctors, nurses, pharmacists and medical devices. 
Characteristically, these apps are designed to gather 
measure and transmit sensitive personal health data, which 
is required to be kept secure through regulations and 
legislation. With the integration of mobile medical apps into 
the healthcare industry, the multitude of sensitive personal 
health data transmitted across various applications, 
technologies and networks is increasing. This raises 
questions about compromised patient privacy and the 
security of the data associated with the mobile apps. The 
detections of increased app hacking by security companies 
and researchers are especially significant amidst today’s 
rapid growth in healthcare mobile apps. Consequently, 
security and integrity of the data associated with these apps 
is a growing concern for the app industry, particularly in the 
highly regulated medical domain. Until recently, data 
integrity and security in transmission has not been given 
serious consideration in the development of mobile medical 
apps. This paper provides an overview of existing mobile 
medical apps data security issues and security practices. We 
discuss current regulations concerning data security for 
mobile medical apps. The paper introduces our current 
research in data security for mobile medical apps. There are 
currently no procedures or standard practices for 
developers of mobile medical apps to assure data integrity 
and security. The paper introduces the concept of a process 
model to assist mobile medical app developers to implement 
data security requirements to assure the Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability of data in transmission. The 
research is grounded on the only published medical device 
security standard IEC/TR 80001-2-2:2012. 
Keywords- Mobile Medical Apps; data security; Mobile 
Medical Apps data regulations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 In mHealth, mobile apps are in general classified into 
mobile health/wellbeing apps (MHAs) and mobile medical 
apps (MMAs) [1]. This classification is predominantly 
driven by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Mobile Medical Applications Guidance [2] and is outlined 
in Table I. Medical professionals and the general public 
use mobile apps to perform many tasks, such as: sharing 
medical videos, photos and x-rays; health and fitness 
tracking; blogs to post medical cases and images; share 
personal health information; and keep track of alerts on 
specific medical conditions and interests [3].  
MMAs are evolving quickly coinciding with the 
processing capabilities of mobile devices and are currently 
one of the most dynamic fields in medicine [4]. The use of 
mobile apps enables dynamic access to personal 
identifiable information and the collection of greater 
amounts of sensitive data relating to personal health 
information (PHI). The use of mobile apps implicates 
changes in the way health data will be managed, as the 
data moves away from central systems located in the 
services of healthcare providers, to apps on mobile devices 
[5]. MMAs by design collect process and transmit large 
quantities of information and data. Increasing reliance on 
mobile apps raises questions about compromised patient 
privacy [6] and the security of the data accompanying the 
apps [5]. There is continued mistrust in mobile apps in 
healthcare handling personal identifiable information and 
PHI in a secure and private manner. The 2015 PwC’s 
Health Research Institute’s survey, claims 78% of 
surveyed consumers were worried about medical data 
security, while 68% were concerned about the security of 
their data in mobile apps [7].  
The impact of data breaches in the medical industry is 
far-reaching in terms of costs, losses in reputation [8] and 
potential risk to patient safety. Reasons for obtaining 
access to PHI can be for monetary gain, to inflict harm and 
for personal intention [9]. An example of the importance 
of cybersecurity can be seen with the health insurer 
Anthem in the US. A reported breach involved hackers 
obtaining personal identifiable information and PHI for 
about 80 million of its customers and employees [10]. The 
information stolen falls under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which is the 
federal law governing the security of medical data and 
could result in fines of up to $1.5million. A data breach 
that maliciously makes changes to a medical diagnosis or 
prescribed medication has serious consequences in terms 
of physical harm and patient safety. With PHI breaches, 
either through physician diagnosis or a treatment plan, the 
possibility of personal harm or loss is pronounced. In 2014 
the SANS Institute, a leading organization in computer 
security training, indicates health care security strategies 
and practices are poorly protected and ill-equipped to    
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  TABLE I.  FDA CATEGORIZATION FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES [2] 
Medical Mobile Apps - Focus of FDA 
Regulatory Oversight 
Mobile Apps which FDA Intends to 
Exercise Enforcement Discretion 
Mobile Apps that are NOT Medical 
Devices 
Mobile apps that: 
 Are extensions of one or more medical 
devices 
 Provide patient-specific analysis and 
providing patient-specific diagnosis, or 
treatment recommendations 
 Transform the mobile platform into a 
regulated medical device  
 Become a regulated medical device 
(software) 
Mobile apps that: 
 Provide or facilitate supplemental clinical 
care 
 Provide patients with tools or access to 
information  
 Specifically marketed to help patients 
document, show, or communicate to  
providers potential medical conditions  
 Perform simple calculation.  
 Interact with PHR systems or EHR systems 
Mobile apps that: 
 Provide access to electronic records, 
textbooks or other reference materials or 
educational tools  
 Are for medical training, general patient 
education and access, automate general 
office operations, are generic aids or are 
general purpose products 
 
 
handle new cyber threats exposing patient medical records, 
billing and payment organizations, and intellectual 
property [11].  
It is largely assumed MMAs are not typically deployed 
in “hacker rich” mobile environments [12]. The detection 
of increased app hacking by security companies and 
researchers is significant amidst today’s rapid growth in 
healthcare mobile app usage [7], [11]–[13]. An Arxan 
report states that many sensitive medical and healthcare 
apps have been hacked with 22% of these being FDA 
approved apps [12]. In the MMA domain, developers do 
not have extensive experience with the types of threats 
other consumer app industries (e.g., banking) are familiar 
with. Consequently, privacy has not been given serious 
consideration until recently, while the importance of 
security is getting recognized little is yet being done [14]. 
The FDA regulates medical devices in the U.S and are 
alert to the cybersecurity of medical devices. In July 2015, 
the FDA issued a cybersecurity alert to users of a Hospira 
Symbiq Infusion System pump, where it strongly 
recommended discontinued use, as it could be hacked and 
dosage changed [15]. In September 2015, the FBI issued a 
cybersecurity alert, outlining how Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices may be a target for cybercrimes and may put users 
at risk [16]. If a cyber-thief changes patient medical 
information or a physician diagnosis, serious medical harm 
or even death can result. An article that references the 
DarkNet, describes how it is now possible to purchase a 
medical identity that mirrors individual ailments, size, age 
and gender, to seek "free" medical services that would not 
be suspicious to a clinician [17]. According to CISCO the 
estimated cost associated with medical identity theft in the 
US, to the healthcare industry in 2015 is $12 billion [18]. 
Development of MMAs is picking up momentum as 
many companies are lured into the domain by the 
explosion of the market and the potential financial gains. 
However, issues arise such as: many of these developers 
do not have a background in the highly regulated domain 
of medical devices and are not aware of the data protection 
and privacy requirements of electronic PHI (ePHI). 
Developers coming from the medical device domain are 
discovering the technical complications of entering the 
mobile domain. The job of securing mobile apps in health 
care is primarily up to those building them, which also has 
its challenges because the developers tend not to be  
 
security experts [19]. The European Commission’s ‘Green 
Paper on mHealth’ findings are that this market is 
dominated by individuals or small companies, with 30% 
being individuals and 34.3% are small companies (defined 
as having 2-9 employees) [20]. This would advocate a lack 
of experience, knowledge and financial means to address 
the issues outlined above. The survey conducted by 
research2guidance [21] highlights that MHA developers 
regard the main market barrier for the next five years to be 
the lack of data security. The health industry is reaching 
out for help in designing security into mobile apps in 
healthcare that go beyond simple encryption to meet the 
potential sophistication of future threats [16]. This 
research aims to assist developers address privacy and 
security of data for MMAs, drawing from the standards 
and best practice perspectives.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II covers background on MMAs, data transmission and 
MMA data security. Section III, outlines the privacy and 
security laws for health data. In Section IV, we introduce 
our research on the development of a process model to 
assure the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) 
of data in transmission for developers of MMAs. The 
concept of a corresponding testing suite is also introduced 
in this section. Finally, we conclude the paper and present 
the future work in Section V. 
II. MOBILE MEDICAL APP DATA 
A. MMAs and Data Transmission 
In July 2011, the FDA issued draft guidance for 
MMAs and defined a “mobile medical app” as a software 
application run on a mobile platform (mobile phones, 
tablets, notebooks and other mobile devices) that is either 
used as an accessory to a regulated medical device or 
transforms a mobile platform into a regulated medical 
device and can be used in the diagnosis, treatment, or 
prevention of disease [2]. Thus, a MMA is an app that 
qualifies as a medical device and is therefore required to 
follow the applicable medical device regulatory 
requirements. Mobile devices, on which MMAs run, now 
provide many of the capabilities of traditional PCs with the 
additional benefit of a large selection of connectivity 
options [22]. Data is transmitted to and from the MMA 
through various approaches depending on the goal of the 
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application. There are numerous MMA deployment 
scenarios that require consideration to ensure data is 
secure. As a result, MMAs use a variety of channels, wired 
or wireless, for transmission in a point-to-point, point-to-
multipoint and multipoint-to-multipoint setting, to 
communicate information. Transmission of data may 
occur between the MMA and for example: remote 
Health/Service Centers; Medical Professionals; or Health 
Record Networks. In some cases, the information sent to 
the MMA is processed on the app and retransmitted to the 
specified device or center. Through MMAs the collection 
of significant medical, physiological, lifestyle and daily 
activity data [20] is greatly amplified and transmitted via 
varied and numerous networks. Data in transit has a higher 
level of vulnerability to both losses through oversight and 
to misappropriation. Misappropriation in the context of 
this research is the unauthorized use of another's name, 
likeness, or identity without that person's permission, 
resulting in harm to that person. Consequently, particular 
attention is necessary to protect information made 
accessible in transmission, particularly when it is personal 
data and ePHI.  
Common technologies used for data transmission in 
MMAs include: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [23]; 
Body sensor networks (BSN) [24]; Wireless Body Area 
Network (WBANs) [25]; Bluetooth/ Bluetooth Low 
Energy (BLE) [24]; ZigBee [26]; UWB [27]; Wireless 
Medical Telemetry Service (WMTS) [28]; communication 
networks such as Wi-Fi [22];  wired communication 
(internet access, broadband and fiber-optic 
communication) [14]; and mobile networks 3G/4G and as 
it becomes more widely available 5G [26]. MMAs are 
predominantly executed from mobile devices and connect 
to wireless sensor networks. Consequently the data 
transmission to and from the MMAs will be predominantly 
via wireless technologies [24]. 
B. Mobile Medical Application Data Security  
Security and privacy related to patient data are two 
essential components for MMAs. The fundamental 
concepts when considering data security are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). 
Confidentiality is protection of the information from 
disclosure to unauthorized parties. Integrity refers to 
protecting information from being modified by 
unauthorized parties. Availability is ensuring that 
authorized parties are able to access the information when 
needed. The intention of health data security and 
protection is to assure patient privacy through 
confidentiality, within the development of functional 
devices, while sustaining the data integrity and availability 
necessary for use [29]. 
When considering data security risks for MMAs it is 
necessary to specify what types of security threats they 
should be protected against. Deployment of MMAs 
involves security threats from multiple threat sources 
which include: attacks; the user; other mobile apps; 
network carriers; operating systems and mobile platforms. 
These security risks are further extended when 
consideration is given to the unauthorized access to the 
functionality of supporting devices and unauthorized 
access to the data stored on supporting devices [30]. Given 
the context in which MMAs are deployed and used, the 
information going to and from the MMA travels across 
potentially many different and varying networks in diverse 
operation settings [31]. In addition, consideration that 
wireless networks and channels are accessible to everyone 
[32] and have shared features, means information and 
network security is equally important in this domain [33]. 
The potential for breaches of CIA of data in transmission 
is consequently greatly amplified by these circumstances. 
The 2015 Ponemon report on mobile app security, 
emphasized that not enough is spent on mobile app 
security [34]. 
1) Attacks: Attacks are  techniques that attackers use 
to exploit  vulnerabilities in applications. There are 
numerous tools available for hacking into MMAs and 
wireless networks. Hackers target mobile apps to gain 
entry into servers or databases in the form of malware 
attacks. A recent list of these tools can be found in the 
Appendix of the Araxan Report [12]. This report examined 
20 sensitive medical and healthcare apps and discovered 
90% of Android apps and no iOS apps have been subject 
to hacking [12]. When data travels across a network, they 
are susceptible to being read, altered, or “hijacked”. 
Potential for breaches of confidentiality of data occurs 
during collection and transmission of data. Data in 
transmission to and from the MMAs must be protected 
from hacking. Some of the most common issues (but not 
inclusive) are Easvesdropping, Malware, Node 
Compromise, Packet Injection, Secure Localization, 
Secure Management, Sniffing Attacks, Denial of Service 
(DoS), SQL injection attacks, Code Injection and Man-in-
the Middle attacks. The consideration of WBANs for 
MMAs must satisfy rigorous security and privacy 
requirements [35]. Wireless channels are open to 
everyone. Monitoring and participation in the 
communication in a wireless channel can be achieved  
with a radio interface configured at the same frequency 
band [36]. This may cause severe damage to the patient 
since the cybercriminal can use the attained data [35] for 
many of the illegal purposes mentioned above. The 
ISO/IEEE 11073 standard deals only with mutual 
communication protocols and frameworks exchanged 
between and has never considered security elements until 
recently, irrespective of all sorts of security breaches [37]. 
Security issues must be resolved while designing medical 
and healthcare apps for sensor networks to avoid data 
security issues [24].  
2) Users: Many of the mobile devices will be personal 
and bypass the majority of inbound filters normally 
associated with corporate devices which leaves them 
vulnerable to malware. It is important that the user has 
good knowledge of the security safeguards, what measures 
149
International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 9 no 3 & 4, year 2016, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/
2016, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org
to follow and what precautions to take [38]. A key 
challenge with MMA data is the lack of security software 
installed on mobile devices [39]. Many mobile device 
users do not avail of or are unacquainted with basic 
technical security measures, such as firewalls, antivirus 
and security software measures. Mobile device operating 
systems are very complex and therefore demand additional 
security controls for the prevention and detection of 
attacks against them [40]. The accessibility of social media 
and email make it easy to post or share information in 
violation of HIPAA regulations.  An example being, a 
New York nurse was fired because she posted a photo to 
Instagram of a trauma room after treating a patient [41]. 
Mixed with the availability to mobile phone cameras and 
social media apps, the risk of employees divulging PHI 
and violating HIPAA requirements has increased [42]. 
One of the greatest threats to MMA data security lies with 
the fact that most are on mobile devices which are 
portable, making them much more likely to be lost or 
stolen [43]. Potentially any data on the device is accessible 
to the thief, including access to any data and hospital 
networks. Due to the regulatory protection of PHI, it is 
important that even when the app is on a stolen device the 
security of the data remains protected and is regularly 
backed-up [40]. Measures should be available to remotely 
lock the MMA, disable service, completely wipe out the 
data [40] and restrict access to supporting devices.  
Not all users’ password-protect their devices. Even 
when passwords are used because of the lack of physical 
keyboards with mobile devices, users tend to not use 
complex passwords to secure their information. The use of 
more than one type of authentication technique suggested 
by Alqahtani, would afford better data security for MMAs 
[40]. The difficulty is requesting lengthened authentication 
requirements from a busy medical professional. Inputting 
numerous passwords, or waiting for an authentication code 
in a pressurized situation is not desirable.  
3) Other mobile apps: Unfortunately, many users 
download mobile apps often without considering the 
security implications. Unintentionally, a user can 
download malware in the form of another application, an 
update or by downloading from an unauthorised source. 
The difficulty in detecting the attack was due to the fact 
that there currently is no mobile device management 
application programming interface (API) to obtain the 
certificate information for each app [44]. An attacker can 
use Masque Attacks to bypass the normal app sandbox and 
get root privileges by attacking known iOS vulnerabilities 
[44]. Cloned apps are a concern, over 50% of cloned apps 
are malicious and therefore pose serious risks. A recently 
discovered iOS banking app malware, Masque Attacks, 
replace an authentic app with malware that has an identical 
UI. The Masque Attacks access the original app's local 
data, which was not removed when the original app was 
replaced and steal the sensitive data [44]. The mobile 
device management interface did not distinguish the 
malware from the original as it had used the same bundle 
identifier.            
4) Operating systems & development: Consideration 
with handling data on mobile devices includes unintended 
data leakage. It is essential that the MMA is not 
susceptible to analytic providers that will sell the data to 
marketing companies. The app stores are attempting to 
address this, e.g., Apple is banning app developers from 
selling HealthKit data or storing it on iCloud. Google 
insists that the user is in control of health data as apps 
cannot be accessed without the user providing permission. 
Developers could include analytics that report how often a 
section of the MMA was viewed, similar to the analytics 
credit card provider’s use to flag unwanted access to data. 
It is equally important to consider the intentional or 
unintentional sharing of personal information. Leakage of 
personal data from the device to the MMA and the leakage 
of MMA data onto personal devices are key 
considerations. The bypass of outbound filters elevate the 
risk of non-compliance with data privacy laws and 
requirements, e.g., the use of personal Dropbox. 
A basic requirement such as encryption is not used in 
many MMAs. Data is encrypted so that it is not disclosed 
whilst in transit. Data encryption service provides 
confidentiality against attacks. The requirement of 
encryption is stressed, not only for the data, but for the 
code in development to assure data security [24][40]. Data 
encryption of passwords and usernames if they are to be 
stored on the MMA is essential; many apps store this 
information in unencrypted text. This means that anyone 
with access to the mobile device the MMA resides on can 
see passwords and usernames by connecting the device to 
a PC. If the MMA is hacked, the information encrypted 
will be useless to the cybercriminals. Many apps send data 
over an HTTPS connection without checking for revoked 
certificates [45]. MMA developers should ensure that 
back-end APIs within mobile platforms are strengthened 
against attacks using state of the art encryption. As 
discussed above a MMA could expose healthcare systems 
that had not previously been accessible from outside their 
own networks. In MMA data security consideration 
developers should always use modern encryption 
algorithms that are accepted as strong by the security 
community. 
Hackers are aware that just because a patch was 
released does not means it was applied, which, in turn 
make the app vulnerable for attacks [46]. Some 
recommend the installation of “Prevention and Detection” 
software for defending and protecting against malware as 
essential [40]. Consequently, software that tracks detection 
and anticipates attacks would require consideration in 
MMA development. 
It is essential that developers research the mobile 
platforms they are developing for. Each mobile OS offers 
different security-related features, uses different APIs and 
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handles data permissions its own way.  Developers should 
adapt the code accordingly for each platform the MMA 
will be run on. There are no standards that straddle 
development or security testing across the different 
platforms. Developers design security for each individual 
OS. 
III. REGULATIONS FOR HEALTH DATA 
This section of the paper highlights some of the 
difficulties MMA manufacturers encounter understanding 
PHI data security and privacy requirements. It describes 
the key regulations on data security and privacy, MMA 
developers are required to observe in Europe and the 
United States.  
Increasingly, MMA developers must deal with a range 
of international regulations if they want to perform 
business in more than one country. The absence of privacy 
laws in some countries, in addition to inconsistency or 
even conflicting laws means PHI is often misused and 
treated superficially. In the rush to market the aspects of 
privacy and security are not properly considered [47]. 
Some MMA providers find they are in breach of 
regulation only when they are warned or fined, blindsided 
by regulatory issues, due to the complexity [48]. Due to 
the surge in value of PHI on the black-market, owing to 
the lack of security controls within healthcare and the 
increase in the security of credit card data [17], privacy 
and security policy issues relating to data with MMAs are 
now of primary importance. The Thomas Reuters 
Foundation and mHealth Alliance published a global 
landscape analysis of the privacy and security policies to 
protect health data [48]. The report states, that most 
jurisdictions agree, data security is essential. The report 
proposes the world of privacy law is divided into three 
major groups: Omnibus data protection regulation in the 
style of the European laws that regulate all personal 
information equally; U.S.-style sectorial privacy laws that 
address specific privacy issues arising in certain industries 
and business sectors, so that only certain types of personal 
information are regulated; The constitutional approach, 
whereby certain types of personal information are 
considered private and compelled from a basic human 
rights perspective but no specific privacy regulation is in 
place otherwise [48]. 
A. European Union 
Data protection and privacy has always been a strong 
concern for European law makers. Within the EU, the EU 
Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) [49] is the 
key piece of regulation that will affect how you manage 
health data. This Directive is currently implemented in 
laws of Member States and requires establishment of 
supervisory authorities to monitor its application. 
However, at the beginning of 2012, the EU approved the 
draft of the European Data Protection Regulation (EDPR) 
[50], and will be enforced by 2018. This means the law 
will apply generally over all states in the EU, it will not 
require individual Member States implementation. With 
this progression in regulation, all Member States will be at 
the same stage of security and data protection [47].  
The Directive enables ease in definition of terms. 
Health data is regarded in the Directive under the ‘special 
category of data’ known as sensitive data [49]. The 
Directive has specific sections in relation to sensitive data 
which include: Rules on lawful processing of sensitive 
data, Article 8 (1- 7); Rules on secure processing, Article 
17, Article 4 (2), and Article 16. The sections stipulate 
specific rules about sensitive data, the processing, 
protection and the requirement that this data is not 
transferred to an end point that does not have acceptable 
levels of protection. The Directive is now the international 
data protection metric against which data protection 
adequacy and sufficiency is measured [51], [52].  
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and 
Council of 12 July 2002 [53], known as the ePrivacy 
Directive, is concerned with the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the digital age. It is 
now law in all EU countries and covers all non-essential 
cookies, and tracking devices. This Directive principally 
concerns the processing of personal data relating to the 
delivery of communications services. It provides rules on 
how providers of electronic communication services, 
should manage their subscribers' data. It also guarantees 
rights for subscribers when they use these services. The 
key parts that MMA developers are concerned with in the 
directive are: processing security; confidentiality of 
communication; processing traffic and location data; 
cookies and controls. 
B. United States 
The key law that applies to health data in the US is 
HIPAA. HIPAA was established to classify security 
policies and privacy rights across the healthcare spectrum 
[29]. As a result, new federal standards were implemented 
to assure patient’s medical information privacy, in addition 
to security procedures for the protection of privacy [54]. 
HIPAA is organized into separate Titles and the security 
and privacy of health data is addressed in Title II, referred 
to as the ‘Privacy Rule’ and the ‘Security Rule’ [55]. The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule covers all PHI in any medium while 
the HIPAA Security Rule covers ePHI. The Security Rule 
necessitates security controls for the physical and ePHI to 
ensure the CIA of the data. The US does not have any 
centralized legislation at the federal level regarding data 
protection and follows a fragmented approach, which 
requires looking at a number of laws and regulations to 
form the definition of terms [55].  The basic HIPAA 
requirements for MMA developers include: Secure access 
to personal health information via unique user 
authentication; Encryption of data that will be stored; 
Regular safety updates to protect from any breaches; A 
system to audit the data and ensure that it hasn't been 
accessed or modified in any unauthorized way; A mobile 
wipe option that allows personal health information to be 
wiped if the device is lost; Data backup in case of a device 
loss, failure, or other disaster [56].  
151
International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 9 no 3 & 4, year 2016, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/
2016, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org
HIPAA was updated in the HIPAA Omnibus Rule 
required by The Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2010, (HITECH 
Act). The HITECH Act established new information 
security breach notification requirements that apply to 
businesses that handle personal health information and 
other health data [57]. The FDA released guidance 
“Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of 
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices” [58]. This provides a 
list of recognized consensus standards dealing with 
Information Technology and medical device security [58].  
The circumstances in which MMAs may transmit 
information wirelessly places them in the domain of 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation, 
to ensure consumer and public safety [59]. Recognizing 
the need for regulatory clarity, the FCC, FDA, Office of 
the National Coordinator (ONC) and the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) came together in a 
grouping called the Food and Drug Administration Safety 
and Innovation Act (FDASIA) Working Group. The 
group, through the FDA, released a report that contains a 
proposed strategy and recommendations on an appropriate, 
risk-based regulatory framework pertaining to health 
information technology including MMAs [60]. 
IV. CURRENT RESEARCH 
A. Research Perspective 
As the MMA domain grows and becomes a standard 
established mechanism for healthcare delivery, both the 
security and privacy of health data will be essential. The 
reference [12] report, which included investigation of 
MHAs and MMAs, highlighted that hacks are on the rise 
in mobile apps. Mobile apps in healthcare are being 
developed persistently without proper data security 
functionality. This is largely due to the lack of 
understanding of current standards and regulation 
requirements pertaining to data security and partly due to 
the fact that many of these apps are developed by 
businesses not familiar with the medical device industry. 
Consequently, a gap exists as there is no standardized way 
to assist mobile app developers in the healthcare domain 
and particularly the highly regulated MMA domain, to 
observe security related requirements of regulation or 
assure data security in operation. A study analyzing 
security vulnerabilities explicitly in mobile health apps, 
highlighted the lack of a global security standard for 
mobile devices [13]. There are no specific MMA standards 
for cybersecurity, which are visible in other industries 
where standards and guidance are available, e.g. the NIST 
Special Publication 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems Security [61]. For mobile apps in healthcare, 
existing regulation and standards must be applied in a 
patchwork method to address security. 
The aim of this research is to investigate this gap 
further and provide a solution to assist clarity in relation to 
data security and regulation for MHA and MMA app 
developers. The intention of this research is to develop a 
Process for identifying the most applicable objective 
evidence to assist MMA developers to assure data security 
for MMAs during development, with specific focus upon 
data transmission. Due to the nature of MMAs and their 
use of public and open networks for data transmission, 
data is particularly exposed at this stage.  
B. Research Setting 
1) International standards, technical reports and best 
practice: This section briefly outlines the international 
standards, technical reports and best practice literature, in 
which the research is to be grounded. The research 
leverages on two medical device standards, IEC/TR 
80001-2-2:2012 [62] and IEC/TR 80001-2-8 [63]. The 
overall objective of the research is to develop a process in 
order to establish security controls pertinent to MMAs for 
all 19 security capabilities outlined in the IEC 80001-2-
2:2012 standard. IEC/TR 80001-2-2:2012 is the only 
published medical device security standard and presents 19 
high-level security-related capabilities in understanding 
the type of security controls to be considered and the risks 
that lead to the controls [64]. It is the only guidance 
available that specifically addresses security requirements 
for networked medical devices [65]. IEC/TR 80001-2-8 
(currently at a committee draft stage) is a catalogue of 
security controls developed relating to the security 
capabilities defined in IEC/TR 80001-2-2. The security 
controls support the maintenance of confidentiality and 
protection from malicious intrusion [66]. The report 
provides guidance to healthcare organizations and MD 
manufacturers for the selection of security controls to 
protect the CIA and accountability of data and systems 
during development, operation and disposal [66]. 
This research proposes using the applicable security 
controls in IEC/TR 80001-2-8 relating to two of the 
capabilities directly associated with data transmission from 
IEC/TR 80001-2-2, as an exemplar. The intent is to use the 
measured applicable security controls outlined in IEC/TR 
80001-2-8, with further research completed to assemble 
security controls pertinent to the mobile aspect, with 
comparative expert validation, by means of analysis of 
applicable standards and best practices. In addition, the 
research aims to establish a corresponding testing suite to 
assure data CIA in data transmission for MMAs against 
the developed security controls. 
 The two specific capabilities from IEC/TR 80001-2-2 that 
relate to data transmission are, TXCF – Transmission 
Confidentiality and TXIG – Transmission Integrity. Each 
capability comes with recommended reference material 
and a common standard to consider when developing and 
establishing security controls. The security controls 
established in IEC 80001-2-8 associated to the TXCF and 
TXIG capabilities will be mapped through the common 
standard and reference materials to establish security 
control objectives and technical strategies for MMA 
developers. Additionally, the security controls will be 
mapped to wireless network and healthcare standards to 
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determine if further controls are required for MMAs. The 
standards currently being mapped to the IEC 80001-2-8 
established security controls are: ISO/IEC 27033-2:2012; 
ISO/IEEE 11073; NIST SP 800-153.   
2) Threat Modeling Analysis (TMA): The research 
revealed Threat Modeling Analysis (TMA) assists in 
understanding and assessing the security risks an asset can 
be exposed to. A key part of TMA is threat modeling. The 
research revealed that threat modelling analysis and threat 
modelling are established methods considered in National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards 
and best practice (OWASP) in relation to mobile app 
security risk assessment. Threat modeling is an important 
basis for defining security requirements of information 
systems [67] and information protection. Threat modeling 
is widely acknowledged in NIST standards [68] and 
recognised as being best practice [69] in risk assessment 
for network and mobile app security. Threat modeling is 
widely recognized as an effective means to establish a 
solid basis for the specification of security requirements in 
app development and is considered as a significant step in 
the security requirement model [70].One of the objectives 
of this research is to develop an operational threat model 
from the developed security controls for MMA data 
transmission. Therefore, an understanding of best practices 
in threat modeling is essential for this research. The aim of 
the research is to create a threat modelling analysis 
framework that incorporates a threat model which is 
aligned with the developed security controls from the 
process model. Primary research has established the 
recommended TMA and threat modeling methods. This 
will be the foundation for the development of a threat 
modelling analysis framework, developed through focus 
groups and validation in two MMA development 
companies and the standards community.   
3) Threats and attacks: The introduction of risk 
assessment requires an understanding of the threats and 
how they exploit vulnerabilities to alter or attack an asset 
from the position of MMA data security. To establish this 
understanding, additional investigation was conducted in 
the area of threats and attacks on mobile apps. The 
research on the classification and some of the most 
common threats and corresponding attacks in the mobile 
app field for data in transmission can be seen in Table II, 
[22], [31], [34], [71]–[73], [74]. This section of the 
research is currently being written into a conference paper. 
By understanding the threats and corresponding attacks in 
this domain, this research will leverage on the existing 
understandings in app security to the MMA field. 
4) Testing suite: The dynamic nature of mobile app 
development creates difficulties for inexperienced 
developers and small organizations, particularly in the 
medical device domain. This is partially due to the 
budgetary resources or motivation to conduct extensive 
testing and this in turn can leave an app, the user’s device, 
and the user’s network vulnerable to exploitation by 
attackers [75].  Security testing of mobile apps is largely a 
manual, expensive and difficult process[76] and security 
testing is seen as  primarily a manual process, with little 
hybrid or automation testing available for use or used by 
developers and a significant challenge [77]. Complexity of 
testing the application security itself and consideration 
relating to the security requirements of open platforms in 
which apps transmit data is an additional emphasized 
difficulty [78]. Investigation has commenced in the area of 
transmission security testing methodologies and testing 
methods and mobile apps, to fully review the landscape of 
transmission security testing. This research was 
undertaken with the collaboration of data security experts 
within a specialist testing company. The company and 
experts have vast experience in working in both network 
and app data security. In collaboration with the testing 
company, their experts and academic experts the 
expectation is to develop a testing suite against the 
considered security controls. The testing suite will be 
developed to follow the information discovery process, 
which includes the threat modeling analysis that was 
developed to address the MMA security controls. A 
diagrammatic summary of the adapted OWASP Testing 
Guide 4.0 [79] and researched considerations required 
when completing mobile app security testing, concerning 
this research, can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 Figure 1. Diagrammatic summary of requirements for mobile 
app security testing. 
OWASP highlight the need to have a clear 
understanding of the testing objectives and, therefore, the 
security requirements to have a successful testing program. 
The information discovery step would be accomplished 
with the completion of the first step in TMA, the collection 
of background information, and the first two steps of threat 
modeling. Both static analysis and dynamic analysis are 
standard requirements in any software testing process, 
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neither analysis approaches are sufficient alone to address 
all testing limitations [79]. In recent years much research 
and development has been completed in the field of static 
source review tools, called code scanners. These scanners 
automatically look for coding errors that can determine 
some security issues. Many organizations are using static 
source code scanners, however this approach is not 
effective when used alone [79]. The limitations of dynamic 
analysis are, it only monitors the behavior of the app 
during runtime and lacks the ability to identify potential 
vulnerabilities [80]. The dynamic approach is therefore 
generally used in the second step of the testing process 
[75], [80]. 
5)  Validation and trailing: Validation will combine 
expert opinion from the standards community, recognized 
experts in mobile data security, testers and developers 
from within the MMA industry. The trailing will be 
completed in two identified MMA companies, which are 
currently collaborating with the research to assure data 
security of their MMAs. Action Design Research (ADR) 
was considered the most appropriate approach for this 
research. ADR methodology was developed to facilitate a 
useful approach to benefit the interests of both IS research 
and organisational research [81] and the evaluation of an 
IT artifact. It was chosen in order to accommodate the 
development of IT artifacts, in collaboration with industry 
and stimulate organisational change when addressing 
transmission security in the development of MMAs. This 
research involves collaborative development of artifacts 
through theory- ingrained research and practice inspired 
research. ADR can account for both technological and 
organisational contexts, shaping of the artifact via design 
and use and influences of designers and users [82]. 
Additionally, consideration of the dynamic setting and 
development environment in which this research will be 
conducted, ADR was considered appropriate methodology 
to facilitate these challenges. 
 
                     
 TABLE II. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ATTACKS IN THE MOBILE APP FIELD  
Grouping of 
Attack Vectors 
Description Examples 
Security 
Concern 
Classification 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
ti
a
li
ty
 
In
te
g
ri
ty
 
A
va
il
a
b
il
it
y 
P
a
ss
iv
e 
A
c
ti
ve
 
Reconnaissance 
Attacks 
Referred to as information gathering, an activity 
that does not noticeably interfere with the regular 
operation of the device. They often serve as 
preparation for further attacks. 
Eavesdropping 
Sniffing 
Port Scans 
Distributed Network Services 
Queries 
x x x x x 
Access Attacks 
Gaining unauthorized access to a device and its 
resources. 
Spoofing 
Man-in–the-Middle 
SSL-stripping 
SQL Injection 
Session hijacking/replaying 
Re-ordering/rerouting 
Port redirection 
Backdoor 
Tampering 
Cross-site scripting 
Security Misconfiguration 
Privilege Escalation Attack 
x x   x 
 
 
 
Denial of Service 
Attacks 
 
Based on the layers 
 
 
Attacks on networks, in order to bring them to a 
stop or interrupt the system by saturating 
communication links or by flooding hosts with 
requests to deny access to the user. 
 
Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
Physical Layer 
Jamming/ De-synchronization 
Tampering  
Data Link 
Collision 
Exhaustion 
Neglect and greed 
Homing 
Misdirection  
Black holes 
Transport 
 x x  x 
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Grouping of 
Attack Vectors 
Description Examples 
Security 
Concern 
Classification 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
ti
a
li
ty
 
In
te
g
ri
ty
 
A
va
il
a
b
il
it
y 
P
a
ss
iv
e 
A
c
ti
ve
 
Flooding  
Malware Attacks 
A program covertly inserted into another program 
with the intent to destroy data, run destructive or 
intrusive programs. 
Worms (Mass Mailing)  
Bot/Botnet /Malicious Mobile Code 
Viruses (Compiled, Interpreted) 
Trojan 
Rootkits 
 x x x x 
Network Attacks 
MANET Re-ordering/Rerouting 
Path Traversal 
Byzantine Wormhole Attack 
Byzantine Attacks 
Black Hole Attack 
Worms (Network Services)  
Flood Rushing Attack 
Floor Rushing Attack 
x x   x 
 WSN Bluesnarfing 
Port Scan 
x x  x x 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper examined existing data security issues and 
practices in relation to MMAs. A summary of regulations 
relating to data privacy and security MMA providers are 
mandated by law to adhere to, were outlined. Compliance 
and improved understanding of data security regulations 
and best practices will assist developers to meet the 
security requirements for data in transmission. The 
security gaps in MMAs are exploited due to lack of 
knowledge, understanding or amalgamated regulation for 
data security with MMAs.   
The mobile app industry claim innovation is stifled, 
due to the lack of clarity in regulations and security 
concerns. Developers will need to find the optimal balance 
between data security and privacy as MMAs expand and 
PHI enters into new aspects. The lack of consistent data 
security to assure privacy, to allow interoperability, and to 
maximize the full capabilities [83], presents a significant 
barrier to the industry. The primary focus for the continued 
research in this area will be two fold. The development of 
a framework to establish security controls for transmission 
of PHI to assist MMA developers assure CIA. The security 
controls will be completed in examining and mapping the 
referenced standards and best practices currently 
recognized in the medical, applications and data security 
domains. The intention is to fill the gap in knowledge and 
understanding for MMA developers, through ease of 
accessibility to the most appropriate information. The 
second objective of the future research is the establishment 
of a practical testing suite for the MMA developers in the 
data transmission domain. The testing suite will be 
developed against the validated mobile transmission 
security controls for PHI. The aim is to test the 
implemented transmission security controls during 
development, use and security patch updates to assure data 
CIA. The implementation of the transmission security 
controls would be encouraged from the preliminary 
development stage with the future research providing a 
checklist for developers with MMAs in the market.   
 Validation of the research will be completed in 
collaboration with two identified MMA development 
companies. The MMAs being developed will have 
different transmission requirements and capabilities to 
assure diversity.  
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